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EuroNATO: An Alliance For The Future

by

Edward M. Whalen
Lt Col, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

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Abstract

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Author: Edward M. Whalen, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

The security threat facing the West was called the Soviet Union and was concentrated in Europe; now that the Cold War has ended the threat has many names and is diffused throughout the region. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will become irrelevant if it does not adapt to the changed international situation. A revised alliance, which I call "EuroNATO," should be established using NATO's structures and processes but: (1) include all European nations willing to join, and (2) go beyond NATO collective defense to collective security. At NATO's birth in 1949, its first Secretary-General said that the simplified purpose of the Alliance was to keep the US in, the USSR out, and Germany down. EuroNATO would update that remark with the "Triple-In" characterization: keep the US in as honest broker, keep Germany in to fulfill its responsibilities, and bring Russia in to avoid dangerous isolation. American and Western leaders should take advantage of the opportunity presented by the transition from the Cold War to a new international order, and adopt EuroNATO to provide security and stability for the future.

Biographical Sketch

Lt Col Edward M. Whalen (BS History, US Air Force Academy; MPA, Golden Gate University) is a European planner on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He started his officer career as a Fulbright Scholar in International Relations at the Albrecht-Ludwig University in Freiburg, Germany. His other assignments include F-4 and F-16 instructor pilot and weapons officer, and aide to the Commander, Tactical Air Command. He concluded his previous tour as an F-16 Fighter Squadron commander at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. Colonel Whalen has been involved with NATO since 1976, and has served as a NATO Tactical Evaluation inspector. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Armed Forces Staff College, and Air War College.

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EuroNATO: An Alliance For The Future

A new world order is not a fact; it is an inspiration—and an opportunity. We have within our grasp an extraordinary possibility that few generations have enjoyed—to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals, as old patterns and certainties crumble around us.

- President George Bush

These hopeful words from the preface of the 1993 National Security Strategy of the United States point to a US that will be an active leader in world affairs. Although the Clinton administration will probably adjust the wording and issue its own strategic vision, all indicators point to a continuation of an activist foreign policy. President Clinton has concentrated his first months in office on the US economy and national budget. International issues, however, loom to challenge the Clinton administration. As this paper is written, the US president is meeting for the first time with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. These two democratically-elected leaders will wrestle with the opportunities and costs of building that "new world order" on the rubble of the old.

The window of opportunity is still open for former Cold War antagonists to take advantage of the transition to a new order. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the mainstay of both American and European security and stability. With bold modification the Alliance can continue to offer the region peace and prosperity. My thesis is that the present US administration must take an innovative approach to international security strategy by leading the drive both to widen NATO's European membership and to expand NATO's involvement in collective security.

This new NATO, which I will refer to as "EuroNATO" to highlight the increased membership and new approach, can provide a viable security framework and the Atlantic link to ensure future stability. In this paper, I will first discuss the European situation and argue why NATO in its current form is not sufficient for the future. Following a section on EuroNATO's proposed missions, I will address the expanded Alliance membership, EuroNATO's relationships with other organizations, and its

benefits to a sampling of states. I will examine EuroNATO's Atlantic link and European identity, the transformational effects of the Alliance, and conclude that EuroNATO is Europe and America's alliance for the future.

I. The Current Setting

The euphoric feeling the West experienced after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, and the collapse of the Soviet empire was short lived. Despite the constant Cold War tensions associated with the bipolar system, it did promote global stability. The West, itself experiencing economic, political, and social difficulties, now views the defeated ranks of its former communist foes not with a flush of victory, but with pangs of anxiety. European and American security depends on stability across the continent, but the immediate prospects for the political and economic health of East-Central Europe are dim. Historical antagonisms, suppressed by decades of totalitarian government, are now free to find their expression in bloody conflicts like the war in Yugoslavia.

Security is the top priority to the newly-freed states of Europe, because without it they cannot develop the economic, political, and social institutions required by free-market democracy. Former Warsaw Pact states are floating in an uncomfortable "security limbo" between Russia and the West. Poland's prime minister recently mentioned East-Central Europe's security *angst*, and wondered whether Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic would "take on the role of a buffer between two antagonistic blocs?" She spoke for all of the East-Central European states when she characterized Poland's situation as "neglected by the West" and "mortally threatened" by authoritarian retrenchments further east.¹

An example of how security concerns stifle political, economic, and social growth is Ukraine's fear of Russia. Ukraine, a country the size and population of France, is a recognized sovereign state—yet it is worried about its basic survival. Many Russians, despite treaty pledges to the contrary, consider

Ukraine part of historical Russia and openly long for its return.² Ukrainians fear the rise of ultra-nationalists in Russia, who regard Ukrainian independence as "unacceptable and a challenge to Russian interests in Europe."³ In the winter of 1993 Russia cut off oil and gas supplies to Ukraine, an act Ukrainians interpreted as "part of a wider Russian campaign to erode their independence."⁴ Twice in its history Ukraine experienced brief periods of freedom, only to be forced back into the Russian empire. Every move Ukraine makes, both internally and externally, is dominated by its security concerns. Ukraine's pace of economic and political reform has been "glacial," due to its fears that any internal instability would be an excuse for Russia to intervene.⁵ Most Ukrainians regard Russia as "the enemy."⁶ Due to its security concerns, Ukraine supports massive armed forces, draining budget resources that should be committed instead to its dire economic needs.

Ukraine has played a cat-and-mouse game with the West using the nuclear weapons on its soil. In order to gain recognition in 1990, Ukraine agreed to comply with the Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaties. Ukraine, however, constantly vacillates between vowing to destroy its nuclear weapons and backpedaling on its promises. Ukrainians want ironclad assurances from the US or the UN that it will defend Ukraine and guarantee its independence.⁷

Turning for a moment from the present to the past for historical analogies, we find one similarity between the current European situation and the Europe of 1815.⁸ Napoleonic France, the major aggressor, had been defeated by an alliance of European powers. But here the similarity ends, because the victors of the Napoleonic wars fully accepted France into the "Concert of Europe," unlike NATO's insistence on holding its former foes at arm's length. The powers of the nineteenth century Concert worked together to prevent any other countries from violently upsetting the status quo. Concert members "repeatedly resorted to joint diplomatic initiatives, military threats and military action to preserve peace in Europe."⁹ Unfortunately, the Concert collapsed prior to the Crimean War and Europe reverted to the shifting balance-of-power politics that eventually led to World War I.

Circumstances in Europe at the end of World War II are more similar to the current situation. The major aggressor, Germany, lay in political, economic, social, and military ruin, and the condition of the European victors was not much better. The Soviet threat loomed over the continent, and American and West European leaders decided to establish a new alliance to provide security, shelter economic recovery, and keep control of Germany while reintegrating it into the international system. NATO was the successful solution to the problems presented by the transition from a multipolar to a bipolar world.

The current situation finds the West's Cold War competitor, the USSR, defeated and dismantled. The economies and societies of the former member-states of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union are in ruins. Consequently, NATO, the organization that so successfully guided Europe through the Cold War, should develop new rationales to lead the Continent through the radically changed international landscape. In its present configuration, NATO is incapable of providing a system of collective security that can deal with current challenges and provide stability in the years ahead.

II. Why NATO Is Not Good Enough

One of the major problems with NATO today is its exclusiveness. The sixteen states that make up NATO are not the only countries in "Europe," which historically extended through Eastern Europe and included Russia. During the Cold War, the West perceived no other Europe but NATO. East-Central and East Europeans today have the same basic need that NATO Europeans had at the conclusion of World War II: security to protect their political, economic, and social rebuilding. NATO, however, is unwilling to share Alliance bonds.

In its 1991 Rome Declaration, NATO declared that its "security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe."¹⁰ Yet according to the NATO Secretary-General "the Alliance has made it clear that it cannot for the foreseeable future invite these countries to become members nor offer them security guarantees."¹¹ What NATO overlooks is that effective security is *the* critical precondition to the

development it expects of the ex-Warsaw Pact states prior to NATO and European Community (EC) membership. By denying NATO membership to its former enemies, European security is endangered and the possibility that the former communist states will succeed in their free market and democratic development is diminished.

A key benefit of the "widening" of NATO is that EuroNATO could provide stability in the areas of Central and Eastern Europe where the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have left a security vacuum. It is in this "Zone of Instability" that historic problems such as: multipolarity, uncertainty, unresolved borders, irredentist claims, dissatisfied minorities, and fear of relative gain would most likely rear their ugly heads and threaten regional and global peace.¹²

EuroNATO's more inclusive membership would reflect the reality that Europe's center of gravity has moved east. Western Europe no longer has deep-seated security fears, but as mentioned above there is no dearth of anxiety in Central and Eastern Europe. EuroNATO could calm these security apprehensions and also provide the newly-freed Europeans the benefits of membership in a strong alliance linked to the US. New EuroNATO members could use their association with a rejuvenated Alliance to help contain their current domestic ills."¹³

III. EuroNATO's Purpose

The basic reasons for NATO's existence would be continued in EuroNATO. The basic NATO tasks are to provide: (1) for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes; (2) for a transatlantic forum for consultations on issues affecting vital interests; (3) for the deterrence and defense against any threat of aggression; and (4) for the preservation of the strategic balance within Europe. Implicit in the four tasks is the extension of the US nuclear umbrella over its Alliance partners. EuroNATO would expand

NATO's membership and take the Alliance further on its journey from collective defense to collective security.

One of EuroNATO's primary security functions would be to guarantee the inviolability of East-Central and Eastern European borders. Russia's membership in EuroNATO could help prevent Russian nationalists from using ethnic minority problems beyond Russia's boundaries as an excuse to forcibly alter its borders. Conversely, moderate Russian leaders could leverage their internal political power by showing how successful and secure democratic Russia was by working within a European multinational framework.

One of NATO's core purposes has been to provide security guarantees to its members in the face of the Soviet threat. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been gradually redefining its purpose to emphasize several aspects of collective security (eg. crisis management, crisis response, and peacekeeping). NATO members realized that an organization that only provides for defense against an attack in Western Europe will be irrelevant in the future.

On 2 April 1993, NATO announced that for the first time in its history it had decided to assume a coercive peacemaking mission. Previously, NATO had stuck to its "deterrence only" role, and undertook only situation monitoring and non-coercive peacekeeping. NATO warplanes will now be deployed to shoot down aircraft violating the UN no-fly zone in the former Yugoslavia. This expansion of its capabilities is a firm demonstration of Alliance resolve. EuroNATO should accelerate this expansion of collective security measures.

Popular and political support for collective security usually disappears once idealistic collective security is proposed. The theoretical version of collective security is highly unlikely to be put into practice. Perfect collective security knows no predetermined enemies. All members of the collective (minus one) would be able to move against an aggressor in their midst if the antagonist overstepped predetermined conditions. The stumbling block is that action must be "emotionless," automatic, swift, and effectively supported by all, which has never worked in reality.

EuroNATO could provide a realistic variant of collective security, using the pre-existing Alliance consensus structure. To effectively provide this form of collective security an organization must: (1) formulate institutional security guarantees that quantify as best as possible the conditions that would cause the organization to assist a victim of aggression; (2) establish a political body that has the ability to settle disputes and manage crises, and if peaceful crisis management fails has a clear mandate to restore the situation; and (3) have a standing multinational armed force available to settle immediate conflicts, and also have the legal means to draw on national troop and equipment reserves if necessary.¹⁴ Since NATO has the structures, EuroNATO could take the Alliance closer to full collective security capability.

The North Atlantic Treaty that was signed in 1949 does not have to be radically changed in order to accommodate EuroNATO's collective security concept. Article 6 of the treaty is the section that is most limiting, as it constrains the Alliance to respond only to an attack on the territory of NATO member states in Europe or North America. Article 4, however, is the "escape clause" that allows Alliance members to consult whenever "the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened."¹⁵ Security can be as limited or unconstrained as Alliance consensus will allow. NATO peacekeeping and peacemaking in the former Yugoslavia is the result of NATO political consultations that sanctioned an out-of-area commitment. EuroNATO would start with the assumption that while in-area defense is a core Alliance value, out-of-area security concerns are also of prime importance.

Even though EuroNATO will have a more expansive concept of collective security than NATO, this does not mean that EuroNATO is forced to act automatically. Conflicts in areas that are strategically unimportant may only be supervised and contained by EuroNATO. The benefit of the intervention to the Alliance must be worth the cost, or it will not choose involvement.¹⁶ EuroNATO will consult, reach consensus, and selectively intervene in conflicts that threaten its security interests.

Does EuroNATO need a new decision-making body? Many suggest that a pan-European security apparatus needs a decision-making council composed only of the larger and more powerful

states.¹⁷ While this may appear more efficient, it would not be as effective as the consultative and consensus approach that NATO successfully employed. EuroNATO would stick to NATO's proven decision-making structure. Any attempt to change this proven process would be politically difficult for EuroNATO's members to accept, and could delay revitalizing the Alliance. It is much easier to expand the existing organization than to start building a new pan-European security collective. In this case, as Gregory Treverton so succinctly remarked, "NATO has the great virtue of existing."¹⁸

Especially in security matters, all states want to have a voice in collective decisions—even though they realize that their ultimate impact on the decision is a function of national power. Another benefit of EuroNATO would be its ability to avoid neutralism among its member-states because of its more inclusive participation. As the recent European backlash against the "top down" Maastricht Treaty illustrates, sovereign democratic states are not content to support dictated policy. NATO has been successful for over forty years despite many internal disputes and member noncompliance with Alliance decisions. There will also be "wiggle room" for disagreement in EuroNATO.

IV. EuroNATO's Membership

In general terms I have mentioned expanding NATO's membership in my construction of EuroNATO. Even though I propose widening NATO membership beyond the current sixteen, I do not think including all forty-eight Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) members is feasible. It is important that EuroNATO preserves the original European focus of the Alliance. EuroNATO should include the original Atlantic members, the US and Canada, which have historical stakes in Europe. The remainder of EuroNATO membership should be offered only to states within the traditional confines of Europe.¹⁹

This definition would exclude Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan from EuroNATO. These states of the former Soviet Union in

Transcaucasia and Central Asia are "culturally, ethnically, linguistically and religiously" part of the Middle East.²⁰ Their inclusion in NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was diplomatically correct at the time but only dilutes the council's effectiveness. Because of Turkey's stalwart support of NATO, I would keep it in EuroNATO to benefit from its strategic location *vis a vis* Central Asia and the Middle East.

Beyond geographic and cultural differences, should type of government decide whether a state be included in EuroNATO? While democracies are preferable, form of government should not block a willing EuroNATO applicant. Even though NATO was founded as an alliance of democratic countries, on several occasions member-states (Portugal, Greece, and Turkey) had authoritarian governments but remained Alliance members. NATO did not eject these undemocratic states, because NATO assumed it "... could serve as a democratic example and even as a coercive force to compel errant countries to return to democratic ways."²¹ EuroNATO members should still be encouraged to obtain and retain democratic practices.

In the past, anti-communism was another key to NATO membership; a commitment to the peaceful solution of security issues will open the door to EuroNATO. Once willing states pledge to uphold the principles of the Alliance, they should be allowed to become full EuroNATO members with complete security guarantees. Delays in accepting the countries of the former Warsaw Pact would only exacerbate external and internal instabilities. It would be best to simultaneously offer membership to all eligible states and coordinate their entry. This would preclude any one state (especially Russia) from feeling singularly isolated by the Alliance.

Russia would be a crucial member of EuroNATO whether the current Russian "democrats" or their more authoritarian opponents prevail. Most of Russia's reasons for seeking Alliance membership are independent of the outcome of any internal political power struggle. At its birth in 1949, NATO Secretary-General Lord Ismay said that the simplified purpose of the Alliance was to keep the US in, the USSR out, and Germany down. EuroNATO would update that remark with the "Triple-In"

characterization: keep the US in as an honest broker, keep Germany in to fulfill its responsibilities, and bring Russia in to avoid dangerous isolation.²²

V. EuroNATO's Relationship With Other Organizations

Several authors have recommended new roles for NATO, including economic tasks.²³ NATO, they suggest, could serve as America's economic link with Europe. In my opinion the Alliance should concentrate on political and military security, where it has been highly effective in the past and could be most successful in the future. EuroNATO would follow the course recently set by NATO of balancing the military component of the Alliance with an enhanced political role.

A tangible benefit of EuroNATO's specialization would be to clarify relations between the confusing "alphabet soup" of European organizations. Today the EC, Western European Union (WEU), NATO, and CSCE claim parts of Europe's security responsibility. Diplomats couch this confusion in terms of "the new European security architecture, made up of interlocking" and complementary institutions.²⁴ This "concept of architecture is too purposive," wrote one commentator; "it implies the existence of, if not an architect, at least a design, blueprint or plan. . ."²⁵ None exists.

In its November 1991 declaration, NATO held both itself and CSCE responsible for: security consultations, arms control and disarmament talks, crisis management, and peacekeeping efforts.²⁶ These roles overlap more than they complement. CSCE could be absorbed by the new NATO when most European states had EuroNATO membership. In the interim, CSCE should concentrate on its human rights, confidence building, and arms control responsibilities.

The EC and the WEU are also not currently capable of handling Europe's security needs. The WEU has made an admirable attempt to strengthen the European pillar of NATO, but the WEU cannot stand alone without the Atlantic link. On the other hand, the EC may someday provide the structure and

process to provide Europe's foreign and security policy, but in the near term is incapable of this task. The CSCE, WEU, and EC should confine themselves to their areas of competence. EuroNATO should expand its expertise: crisis management, defense, and the use of military force in the settlement of disputes.

EuroNATO's capabilities are exactly what the UN is looking for in a regional organization. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter directs the Security Council not only to permit but to encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes by regional organizations, and to sanction regional "enforcement action" where appropriate. The world body realizes that local actors have a deeper understanding of regional issues, and could more effectively defuse crises and enforce peace in their area.²⁷ Despite NATO's delay in getting involved, its enforcement of UN sanctions in the Balkans is a good example of this theory in action.

VI. EuroNATO's Benefits To Selected States

Normally countries join alliances because it is more efficient and effective to pool resources to attain common purpose. My conclusion is that the costs of membership in EuroNATO (including subordination of absolute national independence to Allied compromise and consensus) are worth the benefits (including security, stability and a wider influence in the region). The following sections will discuss the benefits of EuroNATO membership to a sampling of states.

United States

The US has always acted under the premise that "Europe was the game with the highest stakes."²⁸ Following the fall of the Iron Curtain and the implosion of communism, Americans were relieved that their commitment to Europe could be drastically reduced. Despite a small minority that calls for total

withdrawal from Continental affairs, most Americans realize that their own security depends on stability in Europe, and that as a superpower the US must remain engaged in the politics of the region.

In the area of economics, however, the US has started to turn away from Europe toward Asia because of the rapid growth in the Pacific Rim. Many compelling reasons nevertheless remain for the US to protect its economic interests in Europe. Despite the current stagnation in the European market, it is still much larger than its Asian counterpart. Europe's gross domestic product is almost twice that of Japan and the four "Asian Tigers" combined. Total European population is twice that of the US, and four times that of the five Asian countries.²⁹ Europe's markets will continue to be important to American international trade.

Another false impression exists that the US has little or no economic stake in East-Central and Eastern Europe. The opposite is true: at the beginning of 1993 the US "pushed Germany aside as the largest investor" in Eastern Europe.³⁰ American businessmen are finding lucrative investment opportunities, as well an enthusiastic demand for American products and services, in the new states of the former communist bloc. Some analysts predict that the economies of Eastern Europe will take off and rival the Asian Tigers' soaring growth rates. Even though the US is focusing inward on its own economy, it must also provide the security required by its growing European markets.

In the military area, the US should examine security challenges from a new EuroNATO perspective, which suggests alternatives to current American security practice. The US has always been part of the integrated NATO defense structure, but has also always considered itself capable of unilateral military action in Europe. Political and economic realities no longer allow this luxury. The US should eschew unilateralism and become an integral part of the multilateral military formations which evolve from NATO's new strategy and EuroNATO's vision of multinationalism.

Economic and political reasons converge in this suggestion. The US can no longer afford to station massive forces on the European continent. Even while adequate combat capability will remain deployed, the US must take advantage of the economic and political efficiencies offered by multilateral

integration and shared specialization. American national security experts constantly predict that the US will fight its future wars as part of a coalition. America can put these words into action in EuroNATO.

In the security area, EuroNATO could be helpful to the US to keep its European partners involved in the burden sharing required by a collective security organization. Germany is a prime example of a state that needs to step up to its political and military responsibilities within the framework of the Alliance. During the Cold War, Germany was constrained both politically and militarily by the Alliance. Once the wall fell, Germany was the Pollyanna ready to declare the end of war as a currency of international politics. The US can use EuroNATO as a means of influencing Germany to fulfill its peacemaking responsibilities in and beyond the European region.

Another benefit of EuroNATO to the US would be its ability to keep Russia and America involved as partners in the resolution of security matters in Europe. Here the US can apply a friendly version of the principle of cooptation; it is better to adjust in order to keep a potential adversary on your team than to spurn him and have to deal with him later as an enemy. It is time that the US shake off the hubris of Cold War victory and see Russia as an important long-term strategic partner. It is to America's advantage if EuroNATO is the forum where Russia's valid national security interests are pursued.

Russia

Russia would benefit greatly by membership in EuroNATO, and current Russian leadership seems genuinely interested in association with the Atlantic Alliance. At the inaugural meeting of the NACC in December 1991, Russia announced that it saw NATO membership as a "long-term political aim."³¹ This incredible change of Russian attitude towards the West in general and the US in particular is illustrated by Russian President Boris Yeltsin's January 1992 comments to the UN Security Council: "We are ready to actively participate in building and putting into place a pan-European Collective Defense System . . . Russia considers the United States, the West and the East not as mere partners, but rather as Allies."³²

The fact that Russia no longer perceives the West as a threat does not obviate Russia's very real security needs. When the Warsaw Pact was in its dying days, the USSR attempted to get its erstwhile allies to sign bilateral defense treaties that forbade them to join any alliance.³³ These states refused. When the Warsaw Pact formally died the USSR lost the buffer it had paid for so dearly in World War II.

The next blow to its security was the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. Not only had Russia lost its East-Central European buffer, but now its historic glacis (Byelarus, Ukraine) disappeared. Even this buffer was replaced by states (some with nuclear weapons!) such as Ukraine that wanted to reject all Russian influence. Another security consequence of the new borders was that 25 million ethnic Russians now live beyond Russia's boundaries and look towards Moscow to protect their interests.³⁴

Another asymmetry in the post-Cold War situation is Russia's position *vis a vis* reunited Germany. Russia's historic nemesis now sits astride Central Europe as an economic powerhouse and a growing political force in a strong European alliance. In contrast, Russia stands alone outside any effective security organization, battered by internal and external crisis. EuroNATO could enable Russia to keep its historical enemies constrained in a strong alliance. This, plus the long list of geostrategic security deficiencies mentioned above, is reason enough for Russia to seek EuroNATO entry.

Russia has come closer to the West, and has recently backed UN peacekeeping efforts. Russia's support of America's lead during the Gulf War made the anti-Iraq coalition politically possible. Today Russian military units form part of the UN peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the Russians see their actions in the troubled regions on their borders — Moldova, Georgia, Ossetia, and Tadjikistan — as regional peacekeeping, and look for support from their Western partners.³⁵ If a crisis in the region got too hot for all concerned, EuroNATO forces could assist or substitute for Russian troops to avoid the spread of war in the region. It would also be better if Russia, Ukraine, and Byelarus, all possessing nuclear weapons, dealt with their differences in a more effective association than the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Both Russia and NATO are realizing that significant threats to their security are nontraditional and would probably come from beyond the European area. Both of their post-Cold War strategies focus on the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disruption of the flow of vital resources, and acts of terrorism.³⁶ Russian fears of ballistic missile proliferation have motivated Russia to undertake a combined effort with NATO and the US, known as the Global Protection System, to track and eventually defeat ballistic missile attacks.³⁷ This convergence of security concerns is another reason for Russian membership in EuroNATO.

Finally, it may be EuroNATO military bonds that are most important for both Russia and the West during this period of political, social, and economic turbulence in Russia. As Fred C. Ikle noted: "For improved relations to become enduring, they must be anchored in institutions that are endowed with steadiness, influence, and continuity. On the Russian side, only the military institutions can currently meet this requirement."³⁸ This may be a golden opportunity for EuroNATO soldier-statesmen to effect the outcome of European security by helping to develop a respect for democratic principles among their Russian military counterparts.

Germany

Germany has been a stalwart supporter of NATO, and could benefit similarly from EuroNATO membership. Raymond Asmus identifies four reasons Germany would seek to remain within the Alliance in the 1990s: (1) Russia will remain a dominant land power; (2) Russia will remain a nuclear power (as will Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakstan in the near-term); (3) a close security relationship with the West is the insurance that safeguards the stability of German democracy; and (4) alternatives to the Alliance are neither attractive nor cost-free.³⁹ EuroNATO membership could provide the collective security Germany seeks in addition to the deterrence it receives from NATO.⁴⁰

German perception of its Alliance membership as an insurance policy has internal and external implications. For historical reasons, both its neighbors and its own population want a powerful Germany imbedded in some multinational security organization. This was true during the Cold War but is even more relevant now that Germany is reunited and a power vacuum exists in East-Central Europe. German economic and political influence will flow naturally into the area that was its historic breadbasket and marketplace. EuroNATO could ensure that there is no recurrence of war between Germany and its eastern neighbors.

France

Membership in EuroNATO by France could resolve the French security paradox whereby France's continued insistence on its security independence contradicts its actual dependence on NATO. France, usually the contrarian in the Alliance, acts autonomously due to strong domestic themes of national self-reliance. After its highly-publicized break with NATO's integrated command structure in the 1960s, however, France renewed its ties with NATO's military and by the 1980s was back in the integrated NATO structure in fact if not in word.

France came to the realization that the Atlantic Alliance was fundamental to French security. In the 1980s France found itself in the peculiar position of berating other NATO allies for not giving the Alliance enough support, thereby lessening French and European security.⁴¹ Membership in EuroNATO could allow France to solve its political and security dilemma. EuroNATO would have enough of a European face to convince the French public that this was a "new and improved" pan-European collective security organization.

French influence in the Alliance could actually increase due to the commitment of its troops to the integrated effort. France's participation in EuroNATO could improve its position relative to Germany

in the Alliance. France has feared that Germany has become too powerful in NATO because of growing German economic and political might. Both neighbors' participation in EuroNATO could also dissipate any ambiguities associated with the Franco-German Corps that does not reside fully in either NATO or the WEU.

Other Former Warsaw Pact States

The desire to join EuroNATO should be strongest in the former Warsaw Pact countries where there is now nothing but security *disorder*. During the Cold War, security was provided by the overbearing Soviet military, which subjugated national forces to Russian control. When the Soviets withdrew, the local forces were severely weakened. "As a result, none of their armies is appropriately trained, equipped, structured or deployed to defend national territory."⁴²

East-Central Europe's Warsaw Pact experience also left a negative meaning to the term "multinationalism," which was a Soviet euphemism for Pact intervention in a member's internal affairs.⁴³ EuroNATO could work to reverse this negative attitude towards collective action. One of EuroNATO's greatest contributions to the region could be to stop the re-nationalization of defense in the region, which would defuse tensions.

Another cause of anxiety in the area is the large number of ethnic minorities dispersed beyond national borders. Any map of Central and Eastern Europe reveals the profusion of scattered minorities and the potential for more ethnic violence between the states of the region. Hungary, having sided with the loser in two world wars, is in the worst situation with 3 million ethnic Magyars distributed throughout its neighbors' territory.⁴⁴ Ultranationalist Hungarian politicians pander to domestic revanchists by calling for the alteration of Hungarian borders, by force if necessary, in order to get ethnic kinsmen back into state boundaries.⁴⁵

Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania have already inquired about NATO membership in part to contain rampant nationalism and ethnic competition. Fears of resurgent Russian involvement further motivate the states of this area to look toward the Alliance to provide crisis management and security guarantees. If some effective multinational organization does not soon take the former Warsaw Pact states under its protection, they may start weaving bilateral alliance webs that would only destabilize the area.

VII. Atlantic And European Identities

In the previous section I examined the benefits individual states obtained from EuroNATO. Here I will look at America's relations with Europe as a whole. There is strong and widespread support for continued US involvement in European security affairs.⁴⁶ Since the end of World War II, Western Europeans relied on the US to provide superpower protection to their continent. The American nuclear umbrella shielded Western Europe from the Soviet threat and obviated the need for Britain and France to procure other than token nuclear forces. Germany was allowed to share the nuclear guarantee without having to develop a nuclear force of its own.

When the Iron Curtain started falling, many voices questioned the necessity of America's presence in Europe. Anti-US protest peaked during the euphoria that accompanied Germany's reunification and Russia's retreat to its present borders. Once reality set back in, however, all Europeans, including the Russians, were unanimous in their call for the US to remain in Europe as a stabilizing force. America precludes Europe from reverting to its "murderous old balance-of-power ways," where "the weak states worried about the strong ones, and the strong ones worried about one another."⁴⁷

The Atlantic link also contributes immeasurably to US security. The current NATO configuration, however, has lost its applicability to the new expanse of Europe, and threatens to reduce the relevance of the Atlantic link. Active American involvement in EuroNATO is crucial in retarding

any drive to re-nationalize European defense. In the Alliance the US provided the overarching security perspective that has benefitted teamwork and integration.⁴⁸ EuroNATO security could benefit from America's strengths in command, control, communications, and intelligence; strategic mobility; and power projection. The new threats that will arise in the 1990s must be met by high technology, powerful multinational militaries, and determined leadership.

International political realities and the new security landscape demand a revised Atlantic relationship of "mutual consideration" between Europe and the US. The Gulf War illustrated the beginnings of this new relationship. Even though many European governments were initially reluctant to join the American-led coalition against Iraq, they eventually did so fearing that after the war the US "might move towards an isolationist posture" if it felt itself overextended and unsupported.⁴⁹

The US realizes that its role in the Atlantic relationship must also change. America dominated NATO because of the immediacy and global nature of the Soviet threat. Now that this threat has disappeared the US no longer needs to overpower its Allies. Because America is withdrawing the bulk of its combat forces from the region, the basis of its military power in Europe has diminished. While the US no longer needs to be a domineering leader, it still needs to lead; Europe does best when America is leading (or slightly pushing) the debate towards consensus and action.

In addition to a healthy Atlantic link, EuroNATO would emphasize the European identity of the Alliance, especially in light of its widened membership. EuroNATO could foster progress towards European integration. This integration has been illustrated as three rings of concentric circles, with the EC of the twelve at the core, then the associated organizations and states (European Free Trade Association, and Central and Eastern Europe) as the next ring, and finally the remaining political definers of Europe (NATO, CSCE) at the outer ring.⁵⁰ EuroNATO could provide security through all rings to the core, and in a three-dimensional sense form a shell to protect the vulnerable process of political and economic integration.

European leadership would become more pronounced in EuroNATO. The next Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) should be a European to reflect increased European responsibility in military matters. Few Americans or Europeans "... believe any longer that an American SACEUR is the *sine qua non* of the US commitment to Europe."⁵¹ To offset the loss of this position, the US should be put in the rotation for chairman of the EuroNATO's Military Committee. EuroNATO would continue NATO's tradition of regularly assigning its top positions to those states that bring the most power to bear in the Alliance.

Further integration of the EC should make EuroNATO a more effective security system and could make it easier for the US to deal with the EC. Most likely Germany and France are going to be the first middle-sized powers to be consolidated into the European core, followed thereafter by the remainder of the EC twelve. Whether or not Russia becomes fully integrated into the EC in the next several decades is not important as long as Russia is anchored in a EuroNATO that gives it a vital stake in the outcome of European security.

VIII. Transformational Effects Of The Alliance

An unintended but pervasive result of 45 years of successful NATO alliance is the transformation of the actors involved in the alliance process. This transformation affected several generations of soldiers and statesmen, and resulted in changed mental attitudes and "habits of international cooperation and mutual reliance that have become second nature" to those involved.⁵² NATO is more effective because of this supranational cadre.

The bureaucratic elites were not the only transformed by the Alliance; the societies of the member states were also altered. In the US, two world wars and several decades of NATO solidarity generated a common identity and a shared fate with Europe.⁵³ Despite the America's tradition of isolationism, it would now be difficult to conceive of a US unconcerned with European affairs. In

Western European societies that were long torn by rabid nationalism, the Alliance fostered political trust and a social community.⁵⁴ European integration will not happen without the broad popular support of the people of Europe, a support that needs to be nurtured further by EuroNATO.

The final reason for proposing to extend EuroNATO across the full expanse of the continent is the abovementioned transformation of attitudes and behaviors. Economic might and military hardware are important components of national power, but so too is the will of the people. NATO altered American and Western European elites and national societies. Commitment to the ideals of the Alliance was just as important as effective organization and hardware in winning the Cold War. The struggling states of Central and Eastern Europe deserve EuroNATO security and should be encouraged to develop an Alliance identity. In a widened EuroNATO there is no reason to expect less of a commitment to the same democratic and free market ideals that inspired generations of Europeans and Americans.

IX. Conclusion

Two reasons motivate states to join alliances: ideals and self-interest.⁵⁵ The US and individual European states would satisfy both of these reasons if NATO were widened into a more inclusive and relevant EuroNATO. As I mentioned above, attitudes and behaviors were favorably altered by the Alliance, and this effect could continue in EuroNATO. Additionally, it is in the self-interest of all European states that their security be inviolate. EuroNATO could provide collective security by giving all European countries a stake in stability while maintaining the Atlantic connection and US guarantees.

Even though EuroNATO would concentrate in the political and military areas, modern-day collective security should also encompass the economic and social dimensions. EuroNATO could provide a shield to all European states, and protect both advanced integration in Western Europe and basic free market and democratic development in Central and Eastern Europe. These times of

international transition offer immense opportunity; the US and Europe must boldly act now and adopt EuroNATO before Europe slips back into familiar and deadly patterns of competition and crisis.

Notes

- ¹Hanna Suchocka, quoted by Hj. Ste., "Warteraum," Die Zeit (Hamburg), 5 March 1993, 1.
- ²Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine and Russia: The Politics of Independence," RFE/RL Research Report, I, No. 19 (1992), 14.
- ³Zalmay Khalizad, "Solving Ukraine's Nuclear Dilemma and More," The Wall Street Journal, 30 December 1992, 6.
- ⁴"Ukraine: Tough Enough," The Economist, 13 March 1993, 57.
- ⁵Roman Popadiuk, US Ambassador to Ukraine, lecture, Kiev, Ukraine, 22 September 1992.
- ⁶Colonel Valentin Pilipchuk, Ukrainian Air Force, Vice Chairman of the Ukrainian Officers' Union, lecture, Kiev, Ukraine, 22 September 1992, and William C. Bodie, comp., "Report of the International Colloquium on Ukrainian Security, Kiev, Ukraine, 28-30 May 1992," (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 19 June 1992), 2.
- ⁷William Matthews, "Nuclear Arms Reduction Delayed," Air Force Times, 18 January 1993, 26.
- ⁸William H. Taft IV, "The NATO Role in Europe & the U.S. Role in NATO," NATO Review, 40, No. 4, (1992), 14.
- ⁹Charles A. and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concepts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe," International Security, 16, No. 1, (1991), 129.
- ¹⁰North Atlantic Council, "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," NATO Review, 39, No. 6, (1991), 20.
- ¹¹Woerner, *ibid.*, 4.
- ¹²James A. Caporaso, "Has Europe Changed?" in Robert J. Jackson, Europe in Transition: The Management of Security After the Cold War, (New York: Praeger, 1992), 22.
- ¹³Jamie Shea, NATO 2000: A Political Agenda for a Political Alliance, (London: Brassey's [UK], 1990), 33.
- ¹⁴Morton Kaplan, ed., Consolidating Peace in Europe: A Dialogue Between East and West, (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987), 135. I used Kaplan's conditions as the basis for the three I developed and modified.
- ¹⁵North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992), 143-144.
- ¹⁶Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends," Survival, Spring 1992, 48.
- ¹⁷Charles A. and Clifford A. Kupchan, *ibid.*
- ¹⁸Gregory F. Treverton, "America's Stakes and Choices in Europe," Survival, Autumn 1992, 123.
- ¹⁹"National Geographic Society Map of Europe," (Washington, D.C., December 1992), notes that the commonly accepted division between Europe and Asia is formed by the Ural Mountains, Ural River, Caspian Sea, Caucasus Mountains, the Black Sea, the Bosphorus, and Dardanelles.

²⁰Bernard Lewis, "Rethinking the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, 71, No. 4 (1992), 104.

²¹Douglas L. Bland, The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strategy. (New York: Praeger, 1991), 8.

²²Jeffrey Simon, ed., European Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989. (Washington, D.C.: The National Defense University Press, 1991), 618.

²³Robert S. Jordan, "The Future of NATO as a Maritime Alliance: Persisting Strategic Certainties in the Face of Political Uncertainties," in Robert J. Jackson, *ibid.*, 172.

²⁴Woerner, *ibid.*, 4.

²⁵Ian Gambles, European Security Integration in the 1990s. Chaillot Papers 3, (November 1991), 16, in Theodore Christodoulides, "The European Security Order; A Greek View," NATO Review, 40, No. 6, (1992), 22.

²⁶North Atlantic Council, *ibid.*, 21, 27.

²⁷Benjamin Rivlin, "Regional Arrangements and the UN System for Collective Security and Conflict Resolution: A New Road Ahead?" in Werner J. Feld and Robert S. Jordan, International Organization: A Comparative Approach. (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 1993), 95.

²⁸Treverton, *ibid.*, 125.

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰Gene Koretz, "Yankees Go East—On a Scale That's Startling," Business Week, 18 January 1993, 26.

³¹Anthony Hartley, The Irrelevance of Maastricht: Redefining the Atlantic Community. (London: Alliance Publishers Ltd., 1992), 40.

³²Boris Yeltsin quoted in Stephen A. Cambone, "Global Ballistic Missile Defense," lecture, US Air Force Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 11 March 1992.

³³Simon Lunn, "The Future of NATO," in Otto Pick, ed., The Cold War Legacy in Europe. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), 11.

³⁴Dr. Steven J. Coffey, US State Department Deputy Director for Russian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Security Affairs. "US Policies Towards the CIS." Lecture, US Air Force Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 7 April 1993.

³⁵Ambassador Nicolai Affanasievsky, "Russia is Pursuing A New Strategy Of Partnership with the West," The Officer, April 1993, 37.

³⁶NATO: North Atlantic Council, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," NATO Review, 40, No. 4, (1992), 26.

Russia: "A Russian View of the World," The Economist, 13 March 1993, 56.

³⁷Russian Defense Minister Grachev quoted in Cambone, *ibid.*

³⁸Fred Charles Ikle, "Comrades in Arms: The Case for a Russian-American Defense Community," The National Interest, (Winter 1991/92), 23-32, in Air War College National Security Decision-Making, Book 2, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, October 1992), 82.

³⁹R. Asmus, "A Unified Germany," in Robert A. Levine, ed., Transition and Turmoil in the Atlantic Alliance, (New York: Crane Russak, 1992), 62.

⁴⁰Christopher Coker, "The Draughtsman's Contract: The Search For A European Security Architecture," in Pick, *ibid.*, 34.

⁴¹Ruiz Palmer, "French Security Policy," in Simon, *ibid.*, 230.

⁴²Coker, *ibid.*, 40.

⁴³Laird, Robbin, The Europeanization of the Alliance, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 124.

⁴⁴Jir Stehanovsky, "Central and Eastern Europe: The Missing Link," in Pick, *ibid.*, 74.

⁴⁵"Little Local Wars?" The Economist, 13 March 1993, S18.

⁴⁶Gerhard Wettig, "Security in Europe: A Challenging Task," Aussenpolitik, No. 1, (1992), 3.

⁴⁷Gregory D. Foster, "Public Opinion: The Fulcrum of Alliance Cohesion," in Alan N. Sabrosky, ed., Alliances in U.S. Foreign Policy, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), 79.

⁴⁸Taft, *ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁹Stuart, *ibid.*, 319.

⁵⁰Carol E. Baumann, "Europe Emergent: A Web of Institutions," in Jackson, *ibid.*, 162.

⁵¹Bland, *ibid.*, 210.

⁵²General Vigleid Eide, "Removal of the Warsaw Pact Military Threat Means Dramatic NATO Shifts," The Officer, September 1992, 31.

⁵³James P. O'Leary, "Economic Relationships Among the Allies," in Sabrosky, *ibid.*, 57.

⁵⁴Sabrosky, *ibid.*, 20.

⁵⁵Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self Interest in America's Foreign Relations, (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 434.

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Glossary

CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EC	European Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Committee
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union